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Abstract
What does it cost a non-profit community organization to run a “high-touch” program for
Individual Development Accounts (IDAs)? This paper presents final unit-cost estimates
(updating Schreiner 2002a and 2000a) for the Community Action Project of Tulsa County. A
participant-month of IDA services had program costs of about $61 (excluding matches). With
net monthly IDA savings of about $20 per participant, $1 saved in an IDA cost about $3.
Benefits were not measured, so it is not known whether they exceed costs. In any case,
knowledge of costs helps inform IDA policy. While not precluding complementary “hightouch”, targeted, time-limited, community-based IDA programs with state, local, or private
funding to provide financial education and other supports, it seems likely that an inclusive,
permanent IDA program would require a high-tech, “low-touch” basic design run by low-cost
asset managers with federal funding.
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Program Costs for Individual Development Accounts:
Final Figures from CAPTC in Tulsa
1.

Introduction
Policymakers and analysts are coming to realize that saving and asset

accumulation drive development and long-term improvement in well-being (Schreiner
and Sherraden, forthcoming; Sherraden, forthcoming; Schreiner et al., 2001; Shapiro and
Wolff, 2001; Ackerman and Alstott, 1999; Conley, 1999; Oliver and Shapiro, 1995;
Friedman, 1988; Haveman, 1988). For the middle and upper classes, a variety of public
policies already subsidize saving and asset accumulation through education, home
ownership, and retirement savings (Howard, 1997; Sherraden, 1991).
The poor, of course, could use similar help. While saving is not easy for anyone,
it is even more difficult for the poor because they start with fewer resources and because
the policy mechanisms that subsidize saving tend to work through tax breaks or to
require existing wealth.
Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) are a new policy proposal designed to
address these constraints and to include the poor in institutions that promote saving
and asset accumulation. IDAs provide matches for savings used for home purchase,
post-secondary education, or microenterprise. (Some programs also match retirement
savings, job training, home repair, or the purchase of cars or computers.) IDA
participants also receive financial education and counseling from program staff.

2

Center for Social Development
Washington University in St. Louis

IDAs have attracted broad political support. Bill Clinton supported IDAs in his
1992 campaign and later proposed a large matched-savings program (Wayne, 1999). In
2000, both George W. Bush and Al Gore had IDA proposals in their platforms (Bush,
2000; Kessler, 2000). About 34 states have IDA legislation (Edwards and Mason, 2003),
and the Assets for Independence Act authorized $250 million for IDAs in 1999–2009.
Furthermore, the Savings for Working Families Act—if passed—would provide $450
million for 300,000 IDAs over 10 years. Outside the United States, Taiwan has an IDAlike demonstration, and Canada has sponsored a randomized IDA experiment. In the
United Kingdom, the Savings Gateway resembles IDAs (Kempson, McKay, and
Collard, 2003), and the new Child Trust Fund will give each newborn an account and a
deposit, with larger deposits for children in poor families (H.M. Treasury, 2003).
IDAs provide benefits to participants. But what do IDAs cost society? This
paper looks at program costs in a “high-touch” IDA program run out of a non-profit
community organization, the Community Action Project of Tulsa County (CAPTC).
Social cost is the value of resources used up in the production of IDAs. Schreiner
(2002a and 2000a) describes the concepts of cost measurement and documents “startup” and “on-going” costs at CAPTC from October 1998 through June 2001. (Sherraden,
2000, comments on this exercise.) The present paper summarizes costs through the end
of the program in December 2003.
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From start to end, CAPTC’s IDA program produced the following accumulated
outputs (Figure 1, lines d–f):
•

471 participants

•

15,213 participant-months

•

$301,645 of net IDA savings
Excluding matches of $377,947 (line j), accumulated program costs were

estimated at $922,473 (line i). Thus, costs per unit of output were (lines n–p):
•

$1,959 per participant

•

$61 per participant-month

•

$3.06 per $1 of net IDA savings
Annual costs per participant-month were highest at “start-up” in 1998–9 ($86,

line l). As the up-front costs of recruitment and financial education were diluted over a
growing participant base, unit costs decreased in 2000–1 to $56 and $41. In 2002–3,
however, unit costs increased to $55 and then $94, as participants left the program,
either after having made a matched withdrawal (a little less than half of participants)
or without having made a matched withdrawal.
After the first two years, accumulated costs per participant-month were constant
at about $60 (line o). For comparison, very rough self-reported cost estimates for 14
IDA programs in the American Dream Demonstration were about $70 per participantmonth (Schreiner et al., 2001).
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Annual net IDA savings decreased at a greater rate than annual costs (net
additions to IDA savings were barely positive in 2002–3, due to unmatched
withdrawals), so the costs per dollar of net IDA savings increased over 2001–3. For this
IDA design at CAPTC, once start-up costs were diluted, time did not reduce unit costs.
The average match rate at CAPTC was about 1.5:1. Thus, matched withdrawals
turned each $1 of net savings into $2.50 of asset accumulation ($1 of savings plus $1.50
in matches). Social cost per $1 of asset accumulation was about $1.82, found as
[$922,473 + ($301,645 x 1.5)] / [$301,645 x (1+1.5)].
Are costs “high” or “low”? The answer ultimately depends on the benefits
produced by IDAs. Unfortunately, these are still unmeasured. Furthermore, IDAs are
still young, and the possible efficiency of service provision is still unknown.
How do IDAs stack up against other financial- and human-capital programs? Ng
(2001) finds that IDAs cost more per participant than 401(k) plans, perhaps because
current IDA programs have fewer participants to dilute fixed costs. Costs for IDAs are
in the same range as some human-capital programs (such as Women, Infants, and
Children) but are much lower than for other programs (such as Head Start).
Of course, the costs of IDAs depend on program design and in particular on the
extent of program services. Furthermore, although the cost estimates here were made
with great care, some values cannot be known with certainty and so, like all such
exercises, the estimates rest on a host of imprecise measurements, heroic assumptions,
and back-of-the-envelope guesses. The margin of error is unknown, and the summary
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measures of output ignore many aspects of the bundle of services that is an IDA.
Finally, these financial-cost estimates do not consider benefits.
Even without knowledge of benefits, rough measures of costs can still be useful.
First, they provide a benchmark for improving future estimates. Second, once benefits
are estimated, unit costs are key inputs for financial benefit-cost analysis. Third,
rigorous measurement of costs provides a healthy balance to anecdotes about the
benefits of IDAs. Wise policy choices must consider not only benefits but also costs
(Schreiner and Yaron, 2001; Devarajan, Squire, and Suthiwart-Narueput, 1997). Fourth,
cost estimates set a performance benchmark; all else constant, the same output for less
cost is better. Fifth, the very existence of measures of cost tends to produce healthy
pressures for efficiency (Schreiner, 2003).
The cost estimates in the two predecessors of this paper sparked lively debate in
the IDA field and contributed to a growing desire to develop and test IDA designs
whose cost structures would allow making IDAs available to all people at all times.
Such a permanent and universal IDA policy would—of necessity—be federally funded
and be run by a center asset manager rather than from “high-touch” non-profits. Of
course, states, localities, and private donors could still fund the targeted, time-limited,
community-based “high-touch” programs that have been the norm so far, perhaps to
complement the basic policy structure with financial education and other supports.
It is tempting to cut costs by hacking off services from the IDA bundle. The real
challenge, however, is to determine which IDA services matter the most and then to
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find efficient ways to provide them. Improvement requires innovation, and innovation
requires incentives. Knowledge of costs tends to create incentives to innovate by
frustrating contentment with the status quo.

The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes IDAs,
CAPTC, and outputs for IDAs at CAPTC. The section after that presents estimates of
costs. The final section discusses unit costs along with caveats and implications.
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2.

IDAs, CAPTC, and outputs
This section describes IDAs, the design of CAPTC’s IDA program, the

characteristics of participants, and some basic measures of output.

2.1

Individual Development Accounts
IDAs are subsidized savings accounts. Unlike other subsidized savings accounts

such as Individual Retirement Accounts or 401(k) plans, IDAs are targeted to the poor,
provide subsidies through matches rather than through tax breaks, and require
participants to attend financial education. IDA savings are matched if used to buy
assets that improve long-term well-being, usually home purchase, post-secondary
education, and microenterprise. In principle, accounts can be opened at birth and can
remain open for a lifetime. Match funds may come from public or private sources, and
there are no restrictions on unmatched withdrawals (except the loss of the match).
Thus, IDAs are a flexible policy tool that almost anyone—the government, employers,
or development organizations—can plug into. Sherraden (1991 and 1988) proposed
IDAs as an example of asset-based development.
To date, most IDA programs have been run out of community non-profits with a
mix of public and private funds. Because of funding constraints, the time frame for
making deposits and matched withdrawals has usually been limited to 2–5 years.
Accounts are kept with regulated, insured banks and credit unions. Most programs
require financial-education classes and provide social support and financial counseling.
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2.2

IDAs at CAPTC
The Community Action Project of Tulsa County is a comprehensive, non-profit

community anti-poverty agency whose mission is to help people in economic need to
achieve self-sufficiency. As part of the American Dream Demonstration, CAPTC ran
one of the first and largest IDA programs. This program featured a social experiment in
which qualified applicants were randomly assigned to either a “treatment” group with
access to IDAs or a “control” group without access to IDAs. Data was collected from
both groups for 4 years, and future work will estimate the benefits of IDAs by
comparing outcomes between the two groups. The program started in October 1998,
enrolled its first participant in January 1999, and ended in December 2003.
On the whole, IDA participants at CAPTC were poor. To qualify, they had to
show past-month pay stubs and past-year tax returns to prove that they were working
and that their income was less than 150 percent of poverty. (Applicants also had to
agree to participate in the experiment, even if assigned to the control group.) At
enrollment, income for the 471 participants averaged 115 percent of poverty. About 45
percent had received income-tested public assistance (Figure 2), and 43 percent had
received non-IDA social services from CAPTC or from a partner organization.
On average, participants were disadvantaged in terms of race/ethnicity, gender,
and marital status. About 46 percent were Caucasian, and 43 percent were African
American (Figure 2). In terms of gender, 77 percent were female. About 76 percent of
participants were not married, and 51 percent were single mothers.
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In terms of education, employment, and bank-account ownership, participants
were relatively advantaged (Figure 3). Ninety-two percent were working or in school,
and 72 percent had attended some college (29 percent had a degree). Before opening the
IDA, 87 percent owned a passbook savings account and/or a checking account.
Matchable uses of IDAs at CAPTC included home purchase, post-secondary
education, microenterprise, home repair, and retirement savings. The match rate was
2:1 for home purchase and 1:1 for other uses. At enrollment, 65 percent of participants
planned to buy a house (Figure 4). The second-most common plan (13 percent) was
“rolling over” the IDA plus match into a Roth IRA for retirement savings.
After opening an IDA, participants could deposit up to $750 per year for 3 years.
Thus, maximum matchable savings was $2,250, and maximum asset accumulation
(savings plus match) was $4,500 ($6,750 for home buyers). About 13 percent of
participants saved the maximum amount, while 52 percent had net IDA savings of less
than $100. Matched withdrawals were possible from 6–42 months after enrollment.
Among participants with a matched withdrawal as of October 31, 2003, 42 percent did
home repair, 21 percent retirement savings, 19 percent home purchase, 12 percent postsecondary education, and 6 percent microenterprise (Figure 4).
The average participant had net (matchable) IDA savings of $640, corresponding
to asset accumulation (if matched at the average rate of 1.5:1) of $1,600. Participants
made deposits in 7 of 12 months and saved 1.9 percent of their income in IDAs.
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CAPTC required 12 hours of general financial education, 4 of them prior to
opening an IDA. Asset-specific education was also required before matched
withdrawals: 5 hours for home purchase, 2 hours of post-secondary education, 16 hours
for microenterprise start-up, and 2 hours for retirement savings.
The IDAs themselves were passbook accounts in the participant’s name in the
Bank of Oklahoma. Participants could make unmatched withdrawals at any time.
(CAPTC kept match funds apart, disbursing matches directly to vendors.) The bank
paid interest on IDA balances and waived minimum-balance requirements as well as its
standard fees for low-balance passbook accounts. The bank mailed quarterly statements
to participants, and CAPTC mailed monthly statements that showed not only the IDA
balance but also the corresponding match. If a participant went a month without
making a deposit, CAPTC staff made “prodding” phone calls.
For this IDA design and these participants at CAPTC, Figure 1 (lines a–c)
shows three measures of output: enrollments, participant-months, and net IDA savings.
An enrollment is when an applicant completes the requirements to participate
and opens an IDA. There were 471 enrollments: 261 in 1999, 208 in 2000, and 2 in 2001.
A participant-month is a calendar month in which an IDA is open. For example,
enrolling in January 1999 and closing the IDA in June 2000 implies 18 participantmonths. The number of participant-months at CAPTC was 1,583 in 1999, peaked at
5,091 in 2000, and then decreased over 2001–3 from 4,435 to 3,020 to 1,084.
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Net IDA savings are matchable dollars in an IDA or already-matched dollars
from an IDA. That is, net IDA savings have been matched or could be matched. Net
additions to net IDA savings were $52,061 in 1999, peaked at $145,910 in 2000, and
decreased to $97,443 in 2001. In 2002–3, additions to net IDA savings were barely
positive ($28,934 in 2002 and –$22,704 in 2003), due both to unmatched withdrawals as
the program wound down and to the fall-off in the number of participants eligible to
make matchable deposits in this period. All told, the average participant had net IDA
savings of $640, or about $20 per participant-month. The next section presents
estimates of the cost of producing these outputs.

12

Center for Social Development
Washington University in St. Louis

3.

Cost estimates
This section discusses some the challenges of the cost-measurement exercise and

then presents the cost estimates.

3.1

Cost measurement at CAPTC
In broad terms, the cost exercise identified resources that were used up and then

valued those resources. CAPTC accountants and IDA staff identified and valued cash
expenses. Staff also identified in-kind and in-time donations, and the donors valued
their contributions in financial terms. This is all straightforward (albeit subject to some
judgment in valuation). The main challenges were to look at costs from an appropriate
point of view and to make the cost estimates representative of a typical “high-touch”
IDA program run by a community-based non-profit.
3.1.1 Social costs
The overall evaluation of the American Dream Demonstration—of which this
financial-cost analysis is but one part—considers the points of view of seven groups of
stakeholders: IDA participants, non-participants, the federal government, state and
local government, the employees of IDA programs, private donors, and society as a
whole (Schreiner, 2000b). For an evaluation, the most important point of view is that of
society as a whole. The narrower points of view matter only inasmuch as all
stakeholders—if they are to do their part—must receive benefits that exceed their costs.
Some stakeholders may not care about social costs (Sherraden, 2000). For
example, if IDA participants’ benefits exceed their costs, then they may not mind if
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IDAs are a net drag on overall social development. Likewise, if IDAs have no fiscal cost,
then the government may not mind if IDA programs divert private donations away
from, say, food pantries or homeless shelters.
The role of the evaluator, however, is to take the point of view of society,
because no one else will (Schreiner, 2003). IDA participants can be trusted to do their
own benefit-cost analysis and to participate only as long as their expected benefits
exceed their expected costs. Likewise, the government can look out for itself. But for a
social decision such as IDA policy, an evaluator must check whether net benefits for
some groups are enough to compensate for net costs for other groups.
While this cost exercise focuses on costs to society, specific groups can derive
narrower measures from Figures 5–7. The focus on social costs has several implications.
For example, matches are a wash for society, as costs to donors are exactly offset by
benefits to participants. Also, contributions from private donors are counted as part of
social cost, although what share is counted as diverted from other “good causes” is still
a judgment call.
3.1.2 Representativeness
Estimates derived from cash and non-cash costs identified and valued by
CAPTC and donors are good approximations of the true costs of IDAs at CAPTC; they
have high “internal validity” (Orr, 1999). CAPTC’s IDA program, however, was not a
typical “high-touch” program run by a community-based non-profit. Thus, its low
“external validity” could limit the relevance of the cost estimates for other programs.
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For example, CAPTC was atypical in that it provided matches for retirement
savings. Also, because CAPTC ran an earlier IDA program, the “younger sister”
examined here did not have to start from scratch (decreasing costs) but faced a diluted
pool of applicants (increasing costs). Furthermore, the program had many more
participants (471) than most current IDA programs. Because CAPTC was one of the
first and largest IDA programs, its staff were often called on to present at conferences,
provide informal technical assistance to newer programs, and to support state and
federal policy work. As pioneers, they could learn only from their own mistakes.
Most importantly, the program’s experimental design—an atypical feature
existing solely for purposes of evaluation—increased costs. Recruitment costs were at
least twice as high, as only half of qualified applicants were assigned to the treatment
group. The prospect of being assigned to the control group deterred some unknown
number of potential applicants, further increasing recruitment costs. Explaining the
experiment one-on-one to potential applicants also required a lot of staff time. Staff also
had to collaborate with researchers during the design phase, and later they had to
respond to requests for evaluation data. Finally, CAPTC knew the importance of the
experiment for future IDA policy, and it responded by providing a very “high-touch”
design. For example, staff called treatment-group members who had not opened an IDA
to press them to do so. Staff also mailed monthly deposit-reminder cards to all
participants, and they made phone calls to check up on participants who went a month
without making a deposit. Because staff wanted the experiment to show that IDAs
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work, they went the extra mile to help participants save successfully. Of course, this led
to atypically high costs as well as atypically high outputs.
These factors have an ambiguous effect on unit costs relative to a “typical”
program. To improve “external validity” and relevance, this exercise has attempted to
measure costs as they would have been, had the CAPTC IDA program been typical. In
particular, extraordinary recruitment costs were removed, along with most other costs
obviously due to the experimental evaluation. Costs due to pioneering policy work and
associated with the extraordinarily “high-touch” service, however, could not be removed.
Further details are available on request and in Schreiner (2002a and 2000a).
No cost estimate is exact. The estimates here—while admittedly coarse—are
accurate to an order of magnitude and are, in any case, far better than the (often
implicit) assumption that costs are zero. In the end, what matters is not that estimates
are perfect and incontrovertible—they never can be—but rather that the measurements,
assumptions, and judgments that support them are explicit and therefore subject to
critique and improvement (Schreiner, Ng, and Sherraden, 2003; Schreiner, 2002b).

3.2

Assumptions
The cost estimates below use several simplifying assumptions. First, the time

value of money was ignored. This is mostly harmless, as the time frame was short,
inflation was low, and most costs and outputs took place in the first few years. Second,
unused funds were assumed to be returned to their donors. Third, donor’s transaction
costs in providing funds (and CAPTC’s costs in securing funds) were assumed nil.
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Fourth, the opportunity cost of participants’ time in financial-education classes and in
other IDA-related activities was ignored. Fifth, the opportunity cost to participants of
saving—tying up resources in passbook accounts, rather than consuming them or
investing them elsewhere—was ignored. Sixth, all donations—whether from public or
private sources and whether in-cash, in-kind, or in-time—were assumed to be shifted
from some other socially valuable use and thus to carry opportunity costs.

3.3

Cost estimates
This section presents estimates of cash and non-cash costs by source.
Private entities that bore costs for CAPTC’s IDA program (Figure 5) included

the Corporation for Enterprise Development (CFED, which handled funds from the
private foundations who funded the American Dream Demonstration); the Bank of
Oklahoma (BOk) and its philanthropic arm, the Kaiser Foundation; the Zarrow
Foundation; CAPTC itself; individual VISTA volunteers; the IDA program’s volunteer
advisory board; and other private individuals and businesses. Overall, these private
sources bore costs of almost exactly $300,000, 57 percent of it in cash. Most non-cash
costs were for recruitment advertising and for waived account fees.
The federal government bore costs (Figure 6) through Community Service Block
Grants (CSBG), Community Development Block Grants (CDBG), the Affordable
Housing Program (AHP) of the Federal Home Loan Bank of Topeka, the Fannie Mae
Foundation, the VISTA program, and public-service advertisements. The federal
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government covered costs of about $612,000 (94 percent of it in cash), mostly for
operating expenses through CSBG and CDBG.
State and local governments contributed $11,000 toward non-cash costs (Figure
7) through a few classes taught by the Oklahoma State Extension Service, some help
with applicant in-take by the Tulsa Department of Urban Development, and some
grant reporting by the Tulsa Housing Authority.
Overall, costs were about $922,000 (excluding the $387,000 in matches). The
federal government covered about two-thirds of these costs, private entities covered onethird, and state and local governments covered 1 percent. About 81 percent were cash
costs, and 19 percent were non-cash costs.
About three-fourths of cash costs were for staff salaries, rent, and overhead at
CAPTC. This reflects not only CAPTC’s “high-touch” approach but also that IDA
programs produce social services and so most costs are for labor. The largest class of
non-cash costs was waived bank-account fees ($5 per participant-month).
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4.

Unit costs and discussion
This section uses the outputs and costs just presented to estimate costs per unit

of output. It concludes with a discussion of caveats and of implications for IDA policy.

4.1

Unit costs
From 1998 to 2003, output produced by CAPTC’s IDA program could be seen as

471 participants, 15,213 participant-months, and/or $301,645 of net IDA savings
(Figure 1, lines d–f). Excluding $377,947 in matches (line j), cumulative operating costs
(line i) were $922,473. The estimates of unit costs are then (lines n–p):
•

$1,959 per participant

•

$61 per participant-month

•

$3.06 per $1 of net IDA savings
Costs per participant rose through time, but this is natural because costs

continued to accumulate even after all participants had enrolled. Costs per participantmonth fell in the first three years of the program but then rose in the last three years,
and costs per dollar of net IDA savings followed the same pattern. This may suggest
that there are economies of size in IDA programs, as costs were lowest in the years with
the most participant-months. Or it may suggest that costs were concentrated at the
start in recruitment and then at the end of the program as staff managed matched
withdrawals.
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The average match rate at CAPTC was 1.5:1. Each $1.00 of net IDA savings
produced $2.50 of asset accumulation. For each $2.50 of asset accumulation, there were
$3.06 of operational costs and $1.50 of matches. Thus, when counting matches, each
dollar of asset accumulation had a cost of about $1.80.

4.2

Discussion
What do these estimates of unit costs mean for IDA policy? While it is easier to

measure costs than to make policy choices, policy choices are easier with cost measures
in hand. The discussion below considers caveats to the exercise, possible political risks
of cost measurement, how IDAs differ from traditional cash assistance, and some final
speculations on the future of IDA policy.
4.2.1

Caveats to cost estimates
The cost exercise took care to count all costs (and only those costs) typical in the

current incarnation of IDA programs. Like any such exercise, it mistakenly includes
some costs and omits others. The direction of bias, however, is unclear, so the estimates
could be too high or too low. While the exact margin of error is unknown, eliminating
all bias probably would not change the orders of magnitude. It appears that in their
current form as “high-touch”, targeted, time-limited programs run from communitybased non-profits, IDAs are costly.
Some specific caveats are noted here. First, this exercise looks at only a single
IDA program, so the results may be purely idiosyncratic and thus void of general
lessons. Second, costs are likely to fall with time, both for a given IDA program and for
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the IDA field as a whole, as programs learn what works, as programs grow and reap
economies of size, and as IDA infrastructure develops. In general, IDAs aim for
development of the highest sort—to improve people’s ability to do and to be what they
have reason to want—and such development takes time and is often indirect and
diffuse. In this sense, many costs have already been incurred, and most of the benefits
are yet to come. Third, it was not possible to completely remove the costs incurred due
to CAPTC’s pioneering policy work and its extraordinary level of “high-touch” service.
Likewise, some one-time “start-up” costs that would not have been incurred by a
“typical” IDA program may not have been excluded. Fourth, it is unusual to count the
opportunity cost of the time of volunteers. Many cost studies do not count non-cash
costs at all. Fifth, the transaction costs for funders and CAPTC in providing and
securing funds were ignored, as were all transaction costs for participants. Sixth, the
costs of IDAs should be compared with the costs of alternatives. But cost estimates for
alternatives usually do not exist, and even when they do, comparisons still hinge on
subjective judgments, as few other things are held constant (Ng, 2001).
Perhaps the key caveat is that costs are best considered in the context of
benefits. Unfortunately, estimates of benefits are not yet available. Even when they are,
the value of many benefits—such as increased home ownership or greater involvement
in children’s education—will be difficult to monetize. In the end, policy makers must
compare apples with oranges, but knowing their costs improves the chances of making
wise choices.
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4.2.2

Risks of cost measurement
In political terms, cost estimates may handicap IDAs vis-à-vis alternatives for

whom costs have not been measured. Pritchett (2002) argues that, for policy purposes,
“it pays to be ignorant”; when costs are left unmeasured, advocates (or opponents) can
safely make whatever claims they find convenient. The same principle holds for
measuring benefits. For example, Orr (1999, p. 257) quotes Rossi (1987) as saying that
“when evaluated, the expected value of the effect of a social program is zero”.
A related issue is that it is easier to quantify costs—at least the costs of service
provision—than to quantify benefits. Thus, costs may seem more “real” and thus carry
disproportionate weight in debates. Thus, while not measuring costs can be a stratagem
to perpetuate inefficient services that benefit favored groups, measuring costs can also
be misused to replace high-cost (but high-benefit) services with low-cost (but lowbenefit) services (Tolley and Rowland, 1995).
If the emperor’s clothes look expensive, the proper response is not to avert the
eyes but rather to describe costs and benefits as well as possible, to explain how to use
the information, and to hope that explicitness, measurement, and the society-wide point
of view wins out over implicitness, anecdotes, and special-interest groups. The on-going
evaluation of IDAs has tried to take the high ground. If, in the policy arena, bad
arguments drive out good arguments, then evaluation serves only to add a pseudoscientific veneer to points that advocates (or opponents) already think they know.
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4.2.3

IDAs and traditional cash assistance
To accumulate $50 in assets in a month through IDAs at CAPTC, participants

saved $20, funders provided $30 in matches, and CAPTC incurred $60 of operating
costs. Would it be better just to send people who would have participated a monthly
check for $90 or so? For several reasons, asset accumulation through IDAs is not
directly comparable with traditional cash assistance for immediate consumption.
Most fundamentally, IDAs were never meant to substitute for traditional cash
assistance (Sherraden, 1991). Hungry people cannot and should not save. Instead, IDAs
were meant to provide access to a positive development policy in the gap between very
poor people who need relief and middle- and upper-class people who benefit from
existing asset-development policies. In this sense, IDAs differ from traditional cash
assistance in several ways.
First, IDAs require participants to save. Thus, IDAs are self-targeted to those
people who are willing and able to sacrifice today for a better tomorrow. Cash transfers
do not have this same type of targeting.
Second, IDAs put time between making deposits and receiving matches, and this
time may prompt participants to “savor their savings” and to think about how best to
use their expected asset accumulation. IDA participants may think about their
resources in ways that the recipients of cash transfers do not, and this may lead to
non-economic changes in patterns of thought and behavior (Schreiner et al., 2001).
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Third, IDAs attempt to restrict matches to the purchase of assets that generally
improve long-term individual and social well-being. In fact, it might be said that IDAs
attempt to transfer not cash but rather homes, human capital, and microenterprises.
Fourth, IDAs are coupled with financial education that attempts to transfer
knowledge and world views conducive to long-term wealth and well-being.
Fifth and finally, counseling and encouragement from IDA staff may boost
saving (Moore et al., 2001).
In short, IDAs are more than just matched savings accounts; they are a bundle
of services and institutional structures designed to make it easier for the poor to save
and build assets. In a way, they seek not only to create savings but also savers
(Sherraden, 2000). Thus, IDAs are not directly comparable with cash transfers.
4.2.4

Costs and the future of IDA policy
Over 4 years, this cost exercise has encouraged the IDA field to step back and

take stock: If these unit-cost estimates are in the ballpark, what should be done? In
broad terms, the responses have involved:
•

Identifying benefits beyond saving and asset accumulation:
o Benefits from financial education and counseling
o Benefits through time
o Benefits to household members and even to local communities

•

Improving the quality of IDA services (e.g., financial education) to increase benefits

•

Finding innovative ways to reduce costs
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The experiment at CAPTC intends to improve knowledge of benefits, but its
results are not yet in. In the meantime, the focus is on improving service quality and/or
reducing costs. This has two parts, promoting innovation and getting staff to work
longer and/or harder. Assuming that staff members already do their best, the only
option left is to innovate, doing more with less by doing things differently.
Unfortunately, innovation does not happen by decree. IDA programs must have
a reason to invest effort and to take risks to try something new. For businesses, the
reason is competition. Often for non-profits, the reason is crisis. In this sense, cost
estimates help create healthy pressure for innovation.
Qualitative research at CAPTC suggests that participants place a high value on
the “high-touch” approach (Sherraden et al., 2003). At the same time, such laborintensive services are costly. Thus, a key challenge is to identify which services matter
most and then to find ways to provide them efficiently.
Unlike traditional cash assistance (a check in the mail to enable greater
consumption), IDAs are a bundle of services, constraints, and opportunities meant to
help poor people to save and build assets. The bundle includes access not only to
matches and a structured institutional saving environment but also to financial
education, staff support, and financial counseling. For some participants, access to a
fee-free passbook account may draw them into the formal financial system, and having
a bank account—even with just a $500 balance—can have large financial and
psychological effects (Caskey, 2002). For others, classes on budgeting, investment, and
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debt can expose them to new ways to come up with resources to save. For still others,
the match makes it worthwhile to expend the extreme effort required to save from their
meager resources. Because IDAs are bundles, it is difficult to know which—if any—
elements could be trimmed. Thus, there is room for innovation to discover how each
part of the bundle works and how they all work together.
Even if the unit-cost estimates in this paper have marked upward biases, and
even if unprecedented cost-saving innovations are developed, the “high-touch” IDA
design will remain costly. Sherraden (2000, p. 7) writes, “With experience and
efficiencies, this figure ($3 per $1 of net IDA savings) might eventually be reduced to $2
or even $1 for each dollar of savings. However, it is most unlikely that costs for
intensive, community-based IDA programs can be reduced to, say, 10 cents for each
dollar of net savings.” Even if benefits do turn out to exceed these costs, funders—and
in particular, the federal government, the only entity with deep enough pockets to
support a permanent, universal IDA policy—might have difficulty supporting IDAs with
the current bundle of services and decentralized structure. Sherraden (2000, p. 8) writes
that “it seems likely that if IDAs . . . are someday to reach millions or tens of millions
of people, (they) will operate as a large, simple, minimum-cost system. This system of
progressive savings accounts would likely be defined in federal law with public
financing, and operated from mutual-fund or other financial-service companies.”
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The tension between intensive services and the types of cost structures that can
reach millions of people may lead to two tiers of IDA designs (Sherraden, 2000). The
first tier would be run by centralized asset managers and would feature broad,
permanent access, simple services, sustainable federal funding, and lower costs. This
“bare-bones” design would reach more participants with lower costs per participant, but
it would also have lower benefits per participant per year. It might plug into existing
529 College Savings Accounts (Clancy, Orszag, and Sherraden, 2004). If low costs make
the “bare-bones” design more sustainable through time than the “high-touch” design,
then it may increase long-term benefits per participant (Schreiner, 2002c).
The second tier would be run from community-based non-profits and would
resemble the current “high-touch” design at CAPTC. It would feature targeted, timelimited, intensive services, and it would be supported by short-term funding from state,
local, or private sources. This “high-touch” design would reach fewer participants and
have higher costs per participant. It would also have higher benefits per participant per
year, and it would reach poorer people. The “high-touch” design could complement the
“bare-bones” design by providing financial education and other supports. As Sherraden
(2000) points out, such a two-tier asset-building policy has a precedent in the promotion
of low-income home ownership.
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Figure 2: Demographic characteristics of IDA
participants at CAPTC
Characteristic
Percentage
Receipt of income-test public assistance
No
55
Yes
45
Receipt of non-IDA social services from CAPTC or partner
No
57
Yes
43
Race/ethnicity
Caucasian
African American
Native American
Hispanic
Other
Asian American

46
43
6
2
2
1

Gender
Male
Female

23
77

Marital status
Married
Never-married
Divorced or separated
Widowed

24
42
31
3

Single motherhood
No
49
Yes
51
Source: Data from CAPTC and calculations of the author.
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Figure 3: Employment status, education status, and
bank-account ownership for IDA participants at
CAPTC
Characteristic
Employment status
Full-time
Part-time
Student
Unemployed
Not working
Education status
Did not complete high school
Completed high school or GED
Attended college
2-year college degree
4-year college degree or more

Percentage
65
18
9
7
1

9
19
43
15
14

Bank-account ownership
Passbook only
13
Checkbook only
29
Both passbook and checkbook
46
Neither passbook nor checkbook
13
Source: Data from CAPTC and calculations of the author.
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Figure 4: Distribution of planned and actual uses of
matched withdrawals among IDA participants at
CAPTC
Use of matched withdrawal
Planned (%)
Actual (%)
Home purchase
65
19
Retirement savings
13
21
Home repair
11
42
Post-secondary education
7
12
Microenterprise
5
6
Source: Data from CAPTC and calculations of the author.
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